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INTRODUCTION

Many view the United States as a country that welcomes immigrants to its shores.' The country does not, however, always greet immigrants warmly. Throughout history, the United States has viewed
new waves of immigrants as "racially different outsiders" and "[a] t different historical moments, German, Irish, Jewish, and Italian immi2
grants all were deemed to be of different and inferior racial stock."
Federal, state, and local governments have enacted laws that discriminated against foreign nationals,3 many of which were motivated by
xenophobia and racism. 4 Some of these discriminatory laws imposed
substantial limitations on immigrants,5 such as prohibiting foreign naSee Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 294 (1978) (stating that the United States is
known as a "nation of immigrants" and that "[a]s a nation we exhibit extraordinary hospitality to those who come to our country"); Kiyoko Kamio Knapp, The Rhetoric of Exclusion:
The Art of Drawing a Line Between Aliens and Citizens, 10 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 401, 407 (1996)
(describing America as an "immigration-driven society"); see also Excerpts From Bush's Address
on Allowing Immigrants to Fill Some Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2004, at A28 (quoting President
Bush as saying "[a]s a nation that values immigration and depends on immigration, we
should have immigration laws that work and make us proud" and "America's a welcoming
country"). Furthermore, in July 2003, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
launched a weeklong commemoration of "the importance of legal immigration" entitled,
"Celebrating a Nation of Immigrants." Press Release, Dep't of Homeland Security, Department Marks July 4 by 'Celebrating A Nation of Immigrants': 9,500 New Americans to be
Welcomed at 50 Ceremonies Nationwide (June 30, 2003), at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=1052 (last visited Mar. 3, 2005). The activities primarily involved highlevel officials attending naturalization ceremonies at different historic locations throughout the country. Id. Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge commented that
"[w]elcoming new citizens to the United States is one of the most important things we do
as a nation." Id.
2 Kevin R. Johnson, The End of "Civil Rights" as We Know It?: Immigration and Civil
Rights in the New Millennium, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1481, 1486 (2002). For example, the adverse
treatment that immigrants currently face in areas like employment has prompted proposals to broaden the legal protection available to immigrants in the workplace. See Ruben J.
Garcia, Across the Borders: Immigrant Status and Identity in Law and LatCfit Theory, 55 FLA. L.
REv. 511, 519 (2003) (arguing that Congress should amend civil rights laws to "include
immigration status as a protected category in addition to race, color, ancestry, and national
origin").
- For a case in which a federal statute placed onerous requirements on immigrants,
see Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), which concerned requirements to qualify for Medicare supplemental medical insurance. For cases related to state-level statutes burdening
immigrants, see Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915), which involved a state law prohibiting employment of foreign nationals on projects that received public funding, and New
York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837), which upheld a New York City ordinance that
required ship masters to provide a list naming foreign nationals seeking entry to the city.
4 See Tamra M. Boyd, Note, Keeping the Constitution's Promise: An Argument for Greater
JudicialScrutiny of FederalAlienage Classifications,54 STAr. L. REv. 319, 322-23 (2001).
5 See Luis F.B. Plascencia et al., The Decline of Barriersto ImmigrantEconomic and Political
Rights in the American States, 1977-2001, 37 INT'L MIRATIoN REV., Spring 2003, at 5, 7. In
this article the authors studied state employment restrictions based on citizenship in the six
states with the highest immigrant populations and created an extensive list of occupations
reserved, at one time or another, for citizens. See id. at 9. The authors conclude that state
citizenship requirements have plummeted compared to prior decades, but that states re-
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7
tionals from owning property,6 running certain types of businesses,
and pursuing certain professions. 8 For example, state laws have restricted noncitizens from selling liquor, operating pool halls, and
working as landscape architects, embalmers, pharmacists, dentists,
and surveyors. 9
Discrimination against immigrants continues today, 10 although
the explicit, state-mandated discrimination prevalent in prior decades
has decreased. 1 Despite this trend, citizenship requirements remain
for a variety of occupations. For example, some states currently require teachers, peace officers, boiler engineers, tax collectors, private
12
detectives, labor dispute mediators, and firefighters to be citizens.
Likewise, in some states, only citizens may establish churches, incorporate limited-profit housing companies, form fraternal benefit socie13
ties, and work for sanitary districts and public safety departments.
These discriminatory statutes suggest that many U.S. citizens perceive immigrants as a threat. 14 National security concerns, specifically
fear of Muslim terrorists after the attacks on September 11, 2001, increased prejudice against people of Muslim faith and Arab ancestry. 15

tain broad latitude in defining the boundaries of their political communities, including the
constitutional authority to impose citizenship requirements for employment. Id. at 20.
6
See Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923) (upholding a Washington state law
prohibiting land ownership by foreign nationals who did not declare their intention to
naturalize); see also Keith Aoli, No Right to Own?: The Early Twentieth-Century "Alien Land
Laws" as a Prelude to Internment, 40 B.C. L. REV. 37 (1998) (discussing the citizenship requirements many states place on land ownership).
7
See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 393 (1927) (upholding a
Cincinnati city ordinance that prohibited foreign nationals from running pool halls).
8 See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 69 (1979) (upholding a New York law that
prohibited foreign nationals who refused to naturalize from serving as public school
teachers).
9 See Plascencia et al., supra note 5, at 9.
10
See Boyd, supra note 4, at 320-21.
11 See Plascencia et al., supra note 5, at 9.
12 See id. at 18.
13 See id. at 18-19. Several commentators have concluded that "the states have an
uninterrupted legacy of excluding noncitizen residents from important economic rights by
enacting laws that restrict employment, public benefits, operation of private businesses,
ownership of land, and other resources to U.S. citizens." Id. at 6.
14 See DAVID WEISSBRODT, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 45 (3d ed. 1992); see also
Patrick Healy, LI. Clash on Immigrants is GainingPoliticalForce, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2004, at
Al (describing the hostile reaction of Long Island residents to the presence of Hispanic
immigrants, a reaction that prompted a proposal to give local law enforcement officers the
authority to detain illegal immigrants).
15 SeeJohnson, supra note 2, at 1488-89; see also William Kates, Poll: Many Would Limit
Some Rights of Muslims, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Dec. 19, 2004, at A32. The article described
a Cornell University study regarding public fear of terrorism that found that nearly half of
the respondents to a national survey supported restrictions on the civil liberties of Muslim
Americans. Id. If poll respondents were willing to restrict the rights of citizens in the
interest of protection from terrorism, one could surmise that respondents might have supported equal or greater restrictions on noncitizens. See ERiK C. NIsBET &JAMES SHANAHAN,
MSRG SPECIAL REPORT: RESTRICTIONS ON CML LIBERTIES, VIEWS OF ISLAM, & MUSLIM AMERI-
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Similarly, when the U.S. economy is weak, foreign nationals frequently
become scapegoats for the difficult job market. 16
To improve the position of foreign nationals in U.S. society, President Bush has recently announced a new federal policy that would
allow illegal immigrants to apply for temporary worker status. 17 Some
politicians criticized President Bush's plan, and it is not yet certain
whether Congress will pass his proposals."' Enactment of the President's immigration proposals would not guarantee better treatment of
noncitizens in all regards. The only certainty is that the nation's treatment of noncitizens-an issue which the President's announcement
pushed to center stage-will remain a prominent topic in the nation's
capital.

(Dec. 2004), at http://www.comm.cornell.edu/msrg/reportla.pdf (last visited Mar.
6, 2005); see also Kevin R. Johnson, September 11 and Mexican Immigrants: CollateralDamage
Comes Home, 52 DEPAUL L. REv. 849, 850 (2003) (arguing that "immigrants in general will
suffer the long-term consequences of the many measures taken by the federal government
in the name of fighting terrorism").
16
See William R. Tamayo, When the "Coloreds"AreNeither Black Nor Citizens: The United
States Civil Rights Movement and Global Migration,2 ASLAN L.J. 1, 15 (1995). Tamayo contends
that "the recent economic downturn has heightened animosity toward the new
'coloreds'-immigrants from Asian, Latin America, the Middle East, and the Caribbean."
Id. Linda Bosniak describes numerous state-sponsored discriminatory measures that target
noncitizens and suggests a framework for analyzing alienage classifications. See Linda S.
Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1047
(1994). Bosniak believes that, because of a "perceived immigration crisis," the country has
difficulty with "alienage as a legal status category." Id.
17
See Steve Holland, Bush, Fox Discuss Immigration Reform, REUTERS, Nov. 21, 2004
(describing discussions between U.S. President George Bush and Mexican President Vicente Fox about proposals to create a guest-worker program in the United States); see also
Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Would Give Illegal Woiks Broad New Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7,
2004, at Al (describing Bush's proposal for a "sweeping overhaul of the nation's immigration laws" that would allow undocumented noncitizens in the country illegally to register
for temporary worker status);Jeff Madrick, Economic Scene, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2004, at C2
(arguing that "limited migration" of workers "can be a vital source of economic growth in
developed and developing nations"); Dean E. Murphy, ImaginingLife Without Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2004, § 4, at I (discussing the reaction to President Bush's proposals that "reopened the national debate about immigration"); President'sState of the Union
Message to Congress and the Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2004, at A18.
18 See David Abraham, Amencan Jobs but Not the American Dream, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9,
2004, at A19 (comparing Bush's proposal to guest worker programs in Europe and contending that those programs have failed); Elisabeth Bumiller, Politics at the Border; N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2004, at Al (quoting Cecilia Munoz, Vice President of the National Council
of the Hispanic advocacy group La Raza, as saying "when people learn the details of [President Bush's] proposal and what it does and doesn't do, it's likely to seem less appealing");
Arshad Mohammed, Powell Sees Better Chance for U.S. Immigration Reform, REUTERS, Nov. 9,
2004 (summarizing Powell's statements that the atmosphere in the U.S. Congress "may be
more favorable to allowing millions of illegal aliens in the United States to obtain legal
status"); Murphy, supra note 17 (quoting one Harvard economist as stating that "it is hard
to imagine a worse immigration reform proposal" than the one proposed by President
Bush).
CANS
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Because foreign nationals 19 cannot vote, 20 they are politically
powerless to prevent citizens from expressing their xenophobia in the
form of discriminatory laws. Muslim and Arab foreign nationals are
the victims of hate crimes, including murder, and the U.S. government profiles them as security risks. 2 1 State governments also discriminate against other foreign nationals, particularly Latino and Mexican
immigrants. 22 Historically, federal and state governments 23 used
alienage classifications to express "racial animus" and "to subordinate
certain racial groups. ' 24 State-sponsored discrimination promotes
negative stereotypes of foreign nationals as being disloyal and untrustworthy.25 Despite the negative effects of state alienage classifications,
courts uphold laws designed to define the state's political community
and reserve the powers of self-governance to citizens. 26 Thus, the
power of states to use alienage classifications is arguably "exceedingly
broad" and leads "to questionable exclusions of noncitizens from important activities."

27

Congress, state legislatures, and courts should consider whether

or not the laws and legal doctrines relating to noncitizens promote
efficiencies in the market that are beneficial to society. This Note ad-

dresses the rights of one class of immigrant noncitizens, frequently
called legal permanent residents (LPRs). This Note evaluates alienage classifications that limit the right of LPRs to pursue careers in the
19 For purposes of this Note, "foreign nationals" will refer to legal permanent residents (LPRs). "Foreign national" is preferable to "immigrant," which merely refers to
people who moved into a country, regardless of how long ago they moved. This Note does
not address the status of foreign nationals who are in the country illegally.
20 LPRs cannot vote in state or federal elections, even though the Constitution does
not explicitly require that result. See Knapp, supra note 1, at 405.
21
SeeJohnson, supra note 2, at 1488-89.
22
See Boyd, supra note 4, at 340; Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling in
Immigration Enforcement, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 675, 707 (2000) (noting that border patrol authorities use race as one factor in deciding whether to conduct investigatory stops, even
though Hispanics constitute a majority of the population in many communities, like those
near the California-Mexico border).
23
Although this Note will specifically address alienage classifications the states created, some discussion of the federal government's use of citizenship as a classifying tool is
necessary for comparative purposes and to provide a full history of the jurisprudence in
this area.
See Boyd, supra note 4, at 339.
24
25 See Victor C. Romero, Proxiesfor Loyalty in ConstitutionalImmigration Law: Citizenship
and Race after September 11, 52 DEPAUL L. RFv. 871, 878 (2003) (discussing the "psychological costs" of race and citizenship-based suspicion on the targets of government profiling
and laws based on race and national origin). Romero also discusses the use of citizenship
requirements and racial profiling, primarily against Muslims and Arabs, since the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. Id.
26 See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439 (1982) (holding that "some state
functions are so bound up with the operation of the State as a governmental entity" that
reserving those posts for citizens is justified).
27 See Plascencia et al., supra note 5, at 5-7.
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United States, specifically focusing on the efficiency of citizenship requirements for employment in various jobs and occupations that the
states designate as "political functions." The primary question this
Note seeks to answer is whether markets function efficiently when
states require some employers to deny individuals employment solely
based on citizenship. As a result of the overlap between citizenship
status and race, 28 and the influence of race on immigration laws and
citizenship requirements in the United States, 29 an economic analysis
of state citizenship requirements must also consider the effects of racism on markets.
Part I of this Note outlines the political function doctrine, which
frames the limits on state and local use of alienage classifications, and
then explains the Supreme Court's modern doctrinal framework.
Part II summarizes the history of alienage jurisprudence in connection with state and local laws. Part III then analyzes the efficiency of
the political function doctrine. Part III finds that citizenship requirements force employers to select employees based on a factor unrelated to job performance and that these requirements ultimately
perpetuate racism in the labor market. Part III also contends that the
political function doctrine itself is inefficient because it enables citizenship requirements to survive court scrutiny, while also making it
easier for states to compel discrimination against foreigners and ethnic groups. Finally, Part IV argues that courts should eliminate the
political function doctrine because it insulates state-created market inefficiencies from heightened judicial review. Because courts are unlikely to reject the political function doctrine altogether, Part IV also
suggests ways to refine the doctrine to limit the harmful effects citizenship requirements have on the market.
I
THE PoLITiCAL FUNCTION DOCTRINE

A.

The Doctrinal Framework: Confusion and Criticism

The Supreme Court's alienage classification jurisprudence is
widely criticized. Some commentators say that the Court is not at its
analytical best in this area.50 Others contend that the Court's deciSee Knapp, supra note 1, at 414-16.
See Boyd, supra note 4, at 323; Johnson, supra note 2, at 1485; Knapp, supra note 1,
at 418-19.
30
See David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community: Political
Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. Pir. L. REv. 165, 196 (1983), cited in Note, The Functionality of
Citizenship, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1814, 1822 n.52 (1997); 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA &JOHN E.
NowAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 18.2 (3d ed. 1999);
Knapp, supra note 1, at 417.
28
29
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sions have relied on "legal fictions" 3' and flawed, if not incoherent,
reasoning.3 2 The main criticism of the Court's alienage jurisprudence
is that it applies a myriad of standards in judging alienage classifica33
Untions-and it strikes down and upholds remarkably similar laws.
34
of the
fortunately, although the "almost byzantine complexity"
Court's alienage jurisprudence has led commentators to call it a "constitutional oddity, '3s 5 the current doctrinal framework seems likely to
remain, absent a drastic reshaping of the Court's composition.
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments36 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protect foreign nationals. 37 The Equal Protection Clause
applies to all people in the United States and requires that the govern38
The Fourteenth
ment treat similarly situated people similarly.
Amendment applies to state actions, including actions by local governments. 39 Although the original purpose of the Fourteenth Amend40
ment was to prohibit discrimination against African Americans, the
Court favors an expansive reading of the Equal Protection Clause to
41
The Court
cover other forms of racial and ethnic discrimination.
See Ibrahim J. Wani, Truth, Strangers, and Fiction: The Illegitimate Uses of Legal Fiction in
31
Immigration Law, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 51, 61 (1989).
32 See Michael Scaperlanda, PartialMembership: Aliens and the ConstitutionalCommunity,
81 IOwA L. REv. 707, 711 (1996) (referring to the Court's "seemingly incoherent [alienage] jurisprudence" and lack of "doctrinal consistency").
33 See 3 RoTUNDA & NowAx, supra note 30, § 18.2 ("The Supreme Court has refused to
enunciate a single test to be used when determining the compatibility of alienage classifications with the equal protection guarantee .... "); see also Liliana M. Garcas, Evolving Notions
of Membership: The Significance of Communal Ties in AlienageJurisprudence,71 S. CAL. L. REv.
1037, 1038 (1998) (examining the Court's alienage jurisprudence, noting the "disparate
approaches and outcomes in alienage cases," and attempting to provide a framework for
understanding the divergent results). For example, the Court struck down a state law that
required citizenship to practice law, see In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973), but upheld a law
requiring citizenship to teach in a public schools, see Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
It is difficult to understand why lawyers, who are officers of the court, do not need to be
citizens while first-grade teachers must be. See also Victor C. Romero, The Congruence Principle Applied: RethinkingEqual Protection Review of Federal Alienage ClassficationsAfter Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 76 OR. L. REv. 425, 426-29 (1997) (describing the different
judicial standards of review for federal and state alienage classifications and arguing for
"congruence" of standards).
34 Earl M. Maltz, Citizenship and the Constitution: A History and Critique of the Supreme
Court's AlienageJurisprudence,28 Amiz. ST. LJ. 1135, 1181 (1996).
35 See Scaperlanda, supra note 32, at 741.
36 U.S. CONST. amends. V; XIV, § 1.
37 See id. amend. XIV, § 1.
38 See Knapp, supra note 1, at 407-08 (explaining that the Equal Protection Clause
governs people within the "territorial jurisdiction" of the country).
39 See 3 ROTUNDA & NOwAK, supra note 30, § 18.5.
See Gilbert Paul Carrasco, CongressionalArrogation of Power: Alien Constellation in the
40
Galaxy of Equal Protection, 74 B.U. L. REv. 591, 608 (1994).
41
See Knapp, supra note 1, at 408 ("However, as the nation's population diversified,
the reach of the Clause gradually expanded to all ethnic groups."); Thurgood Marshall,
Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1987).
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uses several different standards to determine whether alienage classifications are compatible with the Constitution's equal protection guarantee, 42 ranging from strict scrutiny 43 to the near abandonment of
44
any scrutiny.
Federalism concerns also play a role in many Court decisions relating to state and local alienage classifications. 45 The Supremacy
Clause dictates that state actions conflicting with the Constitution are
invalid. 46 Therefore, if the Constitution specifically grants the federal
government authority over a particular area of the law, the states cannot interfere. 47 The federal concern with state use of alienage classifications derives from the fact that the federal government (and not the
4
states) has the authority to control immigration and naturalization.
The Court defers to federal legislation and executive action that
relates to immigration and naturalization because of the foreign affairs power those branches exercise. 49 Because state and local governments are not involved in foreign affairs, "their use of alienage
classifications would have to be reasonably justified by a significant
local interest."50 Therefore, state laws that classify based on alienage
are subject to strictjudicial scrutiny, 51 unless the classification involves
'5 2
the state's powers of "self-governance" or other "political functions.
Laws that fall within the political function exception are subject to
less-searching scrutiny and must only rationally relate to a legitimate
government objective. 53 The Court generally upholds laws that fall
See Knapp, supra note 1, at 409-11.
See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (applying strict scrutiny to an
alienage classification).
44 See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (treating the alienage classification in a manner similar to a nonjusticiable political question and refusing to subject the
government action to any form of meaningful scrutiny).
45 See Maltz, supra note 34, at 1154.
46
See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl.2; Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) (holding that a state law governing the admission of foreign nationals who arrived by ship was
invalid because it conflicted with the Commerce Clause power).
47
See Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 280-81.
48 See 3 ROTUNDA & Now~Ay, supra note 30, § 18.12.
49 See id. (explaining that "[slo long as a federal alienage classification was not a totally arbitrary means of disfavoring lawfully resident aliens, the classification would be upheld" because of the "federal interest in international affairs, as well as the federal power
over immigration and naturalization").
50
Id.
51
See id.
52
See id. (stating that a local "alienage classification .. .which relates to allocating
power or positions in the political process will be upheld under the traditional rational
basis test").
53 An example may help illustrate the impact of the political function doctrine. State
A passes a law making it illegal for noncitizens to fish in state rivers. State B passes a law
making it illegal for noncitizens to become police officers. A court would likely subject
State A's law to strict scrutiny. Fishing in rivers has nothing to do with the "political functions" related to the process of state self-governance. A court would likely subject State B's
42
43
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within the political function exception and receive this lower level of
54
scrutiny.
Although the federal government can use classifications based on
alienage with near impunity from judicial review, 55 the states receive
less deference from the courts. Professor Gerald Neuman suggests
that the history of xenophobia in the United States illustrates why the
Court should view state alienage classifications with skepticism. 56
First, particular immigrant groups tend to settle in the United States
in clusters based on ethnicity, 57 which results in tensions between
groups of foreign nationals and local citizens. 58 This tension often
takes the form of "localized anti-alien movements." 59 Unlike individual states, the federal government is less likely to fall prey to such
xenophobic fervor "in part because emotions are not running so high
in other states at the moment."60 Neuman also argues that aliens
"have some virtual representation in Washington by means of the foreign affairs establishment, which knows that the United States will
have to answer in the international community for actions taken at
home." 6' Because states cannot control the entry of foreign nationals,
states direct "their frustration and resentment about unwelcome federal policies into hostility toward" the foreign nationals who reside
within the state's borders.6 2 For this reason, courts view state alienage
classifications with more suspicion than federal classifications.
law, however, to rational relationship scrutiny because police officers represent the authority of the state, and the role of a police officer is an important political function.
54 See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a ChangingCourt: A Model for a Newer EqualProtection,86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 14-15
(1972). In comparison to rational basis review, Gunther described strict scrutiny as "'strict'
in theory and fatal in fact." See id. at 8; see also Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 348 U.S. 483,
487-88 (1955) (describing the rational basis review standard).
55 See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769-70 (1972).
56 See Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition187, and the
Structure of EqualProtection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. RE,. 1425, 1436-37 (1995).
57
58

Id.

Id.
59 Id. For example, California has enacted laws to prevent Asian immigrants from
engaging in activities such as fishing, see, e.g., Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S.,
410 (1948), and operating laundries, see, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
The most notable modern example of such behavior in California is Proposition 187,
which denies undocumented foreign nationals ("illegal immigrants") access to basic government services. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10001.5 (West 2001); see also Patrick
Healy, L.L Clash on Immigrants is GainingPolitical Force, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2004, at Al
(detailing attempts of Long Island politicians to prevent Hispanic immigrants from living
and working in their communities by strictly enforcing ordinances to prevent groups of day
laborers from waiting for potential employers on street corners).
60 See Neuman, supra note 56, at 1435-37 (stating that this is why "local anti-foreign
movements may have difficulty enlisting the national government in their crusades").
61 Id. at 1436-37.
62 See id. at 1436-39.
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Nonetheless, the political function doctrine enables states to classify people based on alienage in ways that federal courts would forbid
if it were done according to race or gender. 63 For example, the Supreme Court would not uphold a law that prohibited African Americans from serving as peace officers, but the Supreme Court upheld a
California law that banned noncitizens from suchjobs. 64 Additionally,
although the Court struck down state laws prohibiting foreign nationals from obtaining fishing licenses, 65 working as professional engineers, 66 gaining admission to the state bar, 67 and becoming notaries
public, 68 the Court upheld state laws prohibiting foreign nationals
from becoming public school teachers, 69 state troopers, 70 and peace
officers. 7 1 Finally, although the Court has held that a blanket prohibition on foreign nationals from state civil service posts violates the Due
Process Clause, 72 the most recent Supreme Court decisions favor a
73
broad reading of the political function doctrine.
B.

A Comparison to Race and National Origin Classifications

The Court's analysis of the Equal Protection Clause regarding
classifications based on race and national origin is relevant because
citizens often direct racial animosity towardnewcomers to the country. 7 4 Race and national origin classifications are "suspect," 75 which
means that such classifications are unconstitutional "unless they are
necessary to promote a 'compelling' or 'overriding' interest of government."76 Racial classifications "run[ ] counter to the most fundamen63
See Carrasco, supra note 40, at 614-17 (describing the jurisprudential framework
for analysis of state and federal alienage classifications).
64 See Cabell v.Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 433 (1982) (upholding a state alienage
classification that required citizenship of "peace officers"). On the other hand, a racial
classification, such as a state law that prohibited Asian Americans from getting jobs as
peace officers, would violate the Constitution. See 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 30,
§ 18.5 (stating that "[c]lassifications based on race or national origin have been held to be
'suspect'" and therefore courts will subject such classifications to strict scrutiny).
65
See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 412-22 (1948).
66 See Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects and Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S.
572, 599-601 (1976).
67 See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 718 (1973).
68 See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219-28 (1984).
69 See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
70
See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
71
See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982).
72 See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 638-43 (1973).
73 For a case involving school teachers as construed to be "policy makers," see Ambach,
441 U.S. at 72-81. For a case upholding a citizenship requirement for toll takers, see
Cabell 454 U.S. at 442.
74
SeeJohnson, supranote 2, at 1485-86; Boyd, supranote 4, at 341. For the source of
the information provided in this brief summary of equal protection jurisprudence, see 3
ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 30, § 18.5.

75
76

3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 30, § 18.5.
Id.
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tal concept of equal protection. ' 77 Discrimination based on national
origin and ancestry is likewise considered suspect.7 Thus, classifica79
tions based on national origin or ancestry are generally invalid.
A nexus of discriminatory intent often combines racism with xenophobia.8 0 If a state described its classification using explicitly racist
terms, however, the Supreme Court would likely invalidate the classification as unconstitutional.8 1 Courts are more tolerant and apply strict
scrutiny far less frequently when states distinguish based on citizenship.8 2 Courts should be aware of the "overlap" between alienage and
race "[t]o ensure that the law does not invite invidious racial or national origin discrimination through reliance on citizenship status." 83
Thus, a citizenship requirement for a job as a teacher or probation
officer might withstand legal scrutiny, even if a court would not uphold a racial requirement for such occupations.8 4 Consequently, the
overlap between alienage and race in the United States potentially enables states to use citizenship requirements as a proxy for unlawful
8 5
racial discrimination.
C.

Citizenship, Membership, and the Political Community

The debate over whether federal courts should permit states and
local governments to use alienage classifications centers on the meaning and value of citizenship. An analysis of the Court's alienage jurisprudence involves a study of the extent to which states and local
governments may treat citizens differently from legal permanent residents (LPRs). About one million foreign nationals become LPRs
77

Id.

78 See id. The distinction between national origin and alienage is important. An alienage classification refers to citizenship, while national origin refers to ethnicity or ancestry.
79 See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 514-17 (2000) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibited Hawaii from allowing only "Native Hawaiians" to vote for members
of a board that administered programs to help Native Hawaiians because the law was an
improper ancestry classification).
80 See Boyd, supra note 4, at 323.
81 See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 413 (1948) (invalidating a law
that, as written in an earlier version, explicitly banned "alien Japanese" from acquiring
fishing licenses).
82
Compare 3 ROTUNDA & Now~A, supra note 30, § 18.12 (explaining that state-but
not federal-alienage classifications receive strict scrutiny unless the classification relates
to a political function), with id. § 18.5 (stating that racial classifications uniformly receive
strict scrutiny). Therefore, while a court would always subject racial classifications to strict
scrutiny, it might subject an alienage classification to rational relationship scrutiny.
83
SeeJohnson, supra note 2, at 1506-07 (arguing that neglecting to address the overlap between alienage and racial status "has significant practical consequences").
84
See id. at 1505-06 (stating that "[a]lthough the law tolerates discrimination based
on citizenship status within limits, it generally prohibits discrimination on the basis of
race").
85 See id. at 1506-07.
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each year8 6 and contribute to American economic and cultural life by,
among other things, paying taxes and serving in the U.S. armed
87
forces.
The vast majority of LPRs cannot naturalize immediately and
must wait for a period of time, usually five years. 88 The law does not
require LPRs to naturalize; 89 the majority of foreign nationals who
become LPRs receive that opportunity because they are closely related
to U.S. citizens and therefore are "family sponsored." 90 This is not
surprising, as family unification is one of the primary goals of the nation's immigration policy. 9' Some LPRs arrive in the United States as
children and therefore are "without much touch with their country of
citizenship" and have "no reason to feel or to establish firm ties with
any place besides the United States."92
Citizenship has been called "a universal and distinctive feature of
the modern political landscape" that is not "a mere reflex of residence."9 Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that "it would be dif94
ficult to exaggerate [the] value and importance" of U.S. citizenship.
But even if the Constitution permits some difference in treatment be86

The number of new LPRs varies from year to year. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 2000

STATISTICA-L YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (2002). In 2000,
the United States granted about 850,000 foreign nationals permanent resident status. Id.
at 1. Sixty-nine percent of those LPRs were family sponsored. Id. at 2. In 2002, the United

States allowed slightly more than one million foreign nationals to become LPRs. U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 2002 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 6 (2003) [hereinafter 2002
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS]. Sixty-three percent of these LPRs were family sponsored. Id. In 2001, the United States also allowed slightly more than one million foreign
nationals to become LPRs. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, 2001 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 3 (2003). Sixty-four percent of LPRs in 2001 were family sponsored. Id. LPRs who arc not family sponsored typically are either admitted under
employment preferences or refugees seeking asylum. Id. at 11-13.
87
See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 544 (2003) (Souter, J.,dissenting) (noting that
male LPRs between the ages of 18 and 26 must register with the Selective Service); Knapp,
supra note 1, at 402 (noting that LPRs serve in the military, pay taxes, and benefit the
community in many other ways).
88 See Demore, 538 U.S. at 544-47 (Souter, J., dissenting); 2002 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 86, at 1; AUSTIN T. FRACOMEN,JR. RT AL., 2 IMMIGRATION LAw &
BUSINESS § 5:14 (2004). The Fragomen treatise explains that an LPR cannot apply for
naturalization until meeting the "continuous residence and physical presence requirements" of the immigration laws. Id. Generally, an LPR must "have resided continuously in
the United States for five years." Id.
See 1 FRAGOMEN, JR. ET AL., supranote 88, § 3:1 (stating that LPRs possess "the status
89
of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States"
(emphasis added)) .
90
See 2002 YEAROOK OF IMMIGRATION STArIsIICS, supra note 86, at 4.
91
See id.; see also Demore, 538 U.S. at 544 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that "the
United States goes out of iLs way to encourage just such [familial] attachments by creating
immigration preferences for those with a citizen as a close relation").
92 Demore, 538 U.S. at 544-45 (Souter, J., dissenting).
93

THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND

POLIcY 2 (5th ed. 2003).
94
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 122 (1943).
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tween citizens and foreign nationals, the range and extent of such
differences must be delineated. 95 The importance of citizenship
"does not answer the ...

important question of how many rights and

which ones are reserved strictly for citizens." 96
Specifying the scope of the political function doctrine is "the art
of drawing a line" between citizens and foreign nationals. 97 One
could view the political function doctrine as "reflect[ing] the Court's
desire to preserve the significance of citizenship as an expression of
community."9 8 Since the 1970s, a majority of the Justices seem to have
believed that subjecting all state alienage classifications to close judicial scrutiny would remove the distinctions between citizens and aliens
and thus "depreciate the symbolic values of citizenship." 99 Citizenship
is less valuable if the law does not distinguish between foreign nationals and citizens, especially in areas involving self-governance. 0° The
primary question concerns the scope of the political function exception-the broader the reach of the doctrine, the more likely it will
curtail the access of foreign nationals to specific occupations.
II
THE HISTORY OF STATE ALIENAGE CLASSIFICATIONS

Today, courts subject state alienage classifications to strict judicial
scrutiny unless those classifications concern state efforts to define its
political community.1 0 1 This approach, however, has not always been
dominant; the Court's alienage jurisprudence has evolved since the
founding of the nation as jurisprudential paradigms developed and
changed. 102
A.

Early Supreme Court Interpretations

Early Supreme Court decisions hinged on federalism concerns
regarding the boundaries between state and federal authority over
borders and immigration, specifically whether states retained signifi95

See Boyd, supra note 4, at 328.

96
97

Id.

See Knapp, supra note 1, at 412.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 411.
For informative histories of the Court's alienage jurisprudence, see 3 ROTUNDA &
NOWAK, supra note 30, § 18.12, which provides an excellent overview of the Court's alienage jurisprudence throughout history, and Maltz, supra note 34, at 1148-62, which argues
in support of the ability of states to classify based on alienage. See also Gerald L. Neuman,
The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1885), 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1833, 1834
(1993) (countering the myth that "the borders of the United States were legally open until
the enactment of federal immigration legislation in the 1870s and 1880s").
98
99
100
101
102
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cant independent authority over their borders. 10 3 Initially, the Court
seemed untroubled by state initiatives to control immigration. For example, in 1837 the Court upheld a New York City ordinance that ordered ship masters to submit a report under oath providing "the
name, place of birth, and last legal settlement, age and occupation, of
every person . . . brought as a passenger." 10 4 Later, the Supreme
Court removed the ability of the states to regulate immigration because the states were visibly abusing immigration and border control
powers through overzealous attempts to curtail immigration. 10 5 In its
effort to rein in the wayward states, the Court invoked the Commerce
Clause power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. 10 6 The
Court reversed its earlier permissive attitude and held that the Commerce Clause functions to "exclude the States from regulating commerce in any way" 07v and that regulation of transportation in
interstate commerce practically operated as a regulation of commerce
itself.'0 8 The Court also emphasized the need for the federal government to have singular authority over immigration and naturalization. 10 9 Thus, the general rule was that the federal government
controlled immigration and the treatment of aliens, and the states
could not meddle. The question remained to what extent states could
classify people based on alienage in areas outside of immigration and
border control.110
B.

Yick Wo v. Hopkins and Special Public Interests

In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 1' the Court explicitly ruled that foreign
nationals fell within the term "any person" in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, meaning that the Constitution afforded foreign nationals equal protection of the law."12 In Yick Wo, a Chinese
103t
104

105

See Maltz, supra note 34, at 1155.
City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 130 (1837).
See Morgan's S.S. Co. v. La. Bd. of Health, 118 U.S. 455, 465-66 (1886) (permitting

ships in foreign commerce to be subjected to state quarantine regulations); Chy Lung v.

Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 277 (1876) (invalidating a California law that required ship masters
to post a bond for foreign female passengers that state officials believed were prostitutes);
Neuman, supra note 56, at 1436.
106 See, e.g., Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283, 419 (1849) (relying on the Commerce Clause
to strike down immigration control laws).
107
108
109

Id, at 417.
See id. at 419.
See id.

110 See Neuman, supra note 102, at 1890-91 (noting that, even after Smith v. Turner,
"[t]he lower courts understood the Supreme Court as approving state police power over
certain categories of migrants" and that "[i]n some instances these cases were invoked as

suggesting broad state power, while in others they were read as limiting state power to a
short list of traditional categories").
111
118 U.S. 356 (1886).

112

See id. at 368-69; see also Maltz, supra note 34, at 1156-57 (providing an informative

discussion of Yick Wo and its significance).
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foreign national challenged an ordinance that required city approval
to operate a laundry in a wooden building. 113 The Court unanimously held that the public supervisors violated the Equal Protection
Clause by denying two hundred Chinese individuals approval while
permitting eighty non-Chinese individuals to operate "the same busi1 14
ness under similar conditions."
Although Yick Wo seemed to place foreign nationals on an equal
footing with U.S. citizens with respect to Equal Protection Clause
rights, other cases decided around the same time did not turn out so
favorably. 1 5 In fact, the Court endorsed state use of alienage classifications as legitimate and proper by upholding several laws that openly
discriminated against foreign nationa-s. 116 The Court permitted states
to treat foreign nationals differently than citizens "whenever the alienage classification related to a 'special public interest,"' provided that
the states proferred a justification other than "mere hostility toward
aliens." 117 For example, in 1914 the Court upheld a Pennsylvania statute that prohibited foreign nationals from hunting game. 118 In 1915,
the Court allowed states to prohibit foreign nationals from working on
government-funded public works projects.1 19
At the same time, the Court affirmed its protection of foreign
nationals against classifications that did not support a special public
interest. In Truax v. Raich,120 the Court struck down a provision of the
Arizona Constitution that required eighty percent of every employer's
workforce to be citizens. 121 The Court held that the right to work was
"the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity" the Equal
22
Protection Clause guarantees.1
The Court's decision in Truax did not, however, hold that states
had to treat foreign nationals and citizens equally. 123 States simply
could not use alienage classifications to deprive foreign nationals of
See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 365-66.
See id. at 374.
115 See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1927) (upholding
a state statute that prohibited noncitizens from receiving licenses to operate poolrooms);
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 218 (1923) (upholding a state law that prohibited
noncitizens from owning land); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 145-46 (1914) (upholding a state law that prohibited noncitizens from hunting game).
116 See 3 ROTUNDA & NowaK, supra note 30, § 18.12.
117
See id. ("The restriction on aliens fell into three main categories: use of natural
resources, ownership of land, and employment.").
Patsone, 232 U.S. at 143-46.
18
119 SeeCrane v. NewYork, 239 U.S. 195, 198 (1915); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 194
(1915).
120
239 U.S. 33 (1915).
See id. at 43.
121
122
Id. at 41.
123 See Maltz, supra note 34, at 1158 (contending that Yick Wo and Truax "are about
'equality' only in a very limited sense").
113
114

1392

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:1377

the right to make a living. 1 2 4 After Truax, states made sure to justify
alienage classifications as legitimately needed to serve a special public
interest, such as the preservation of valuable state resources.1 5 The
difference between "an ordinary means of livelihood" and a resource
worthy of "special public interest" was a "value-laden judgment," and
the Court usually sided with the state over the foreign national. 126
In 1948, the Court approached state alienage classifications differently. In Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, the Court struck
down a California statute that prohibited issuance of a fishing license
to any "person ineligible to [sic] citizenship."'1 7 The California legislature first passed a law that prohibited Japanese nationals from receiving fishing licenses while the United States was at war with Japan,
but the state changed the law (to exclude those "ineligible to citizenship") because state officials believed a law explicitly referencing one
racial classification would be unconstitutional. 12 8 California argued
that its law fit under the protection of the special public interest doctrine and that the state's interest in the fish allowed a restriction on
129
the ability of foreign nationals to use valuable natural resources.
The argument fit well with prior case law involving the special public
interest doctrine,1 30 but in Takahashi the Court reached a different
result. Takahashi represented an important shift in the Court's alienage jurisprudence because it viewed the state law as a racial classification motivated by California's desire to discriminate against Japanese
31
nationals.

124

See Knapp, supra note 1, at 410.

See, e.g., Cockrill v. California, 268 U.S. 258, 261 (1925) (upholding a state statute
under which land would escheat to the state if the owner attempted to convey it to a noncitizen); Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326, 334 (1923) (supporting a state law that prohibited
transfer to noncitizens of shares of a corporation that owned land); Webb v. O'Brien, 263
U.S. 313, 322-23 (1923) (upholding a law that prohibited food crop contracts with noncitizens); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 217 (1923) (upholding a state statute prohibiting land ownership by noncitizens because the state had a "special public interest" in the
use of its land); Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195, 198 (1915) (upholding a state law that
required the hiring of citizens for public works projects because of the "public character"
of such work); Helm v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 192-93 (1915) (same).
126 See Knapp, supra note 1, at 410.
127 334 U.S. 410, 413 (1948).
128 See id.
129
See id. at 419.
130
See, e.g., Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 143-46 (1914).
131
See Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 420; id. at 422 (Murphy, J., concurring) ("Even the most
cursory examination of the background of the statute demonstrates that it was designed
solely to discriminate against such persons in a manner inconsistent with the concept of
equal protection of the laws. Legislation of that type is not entitled to wear the cloak of
constitutionality.").
125
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Strict Scrutiny for State Alienage Classifications

In 1971, the Court extended its holding in Takahashi and subjected an alienage classification to strict judicial scrutiny, thereby
throwing the special public interest line of cases into question. 132 In
Graham v. Richardson, the Court held that a state violated the Equal
Protection Clause if it limited welfare benefits to citizens or individuals who had lived in the country for a period of time.1 33" Relying on
Takahashi, the Court stated that its case law generally considered state
alienage classifications to be similar to racial and national origin classifications.13 4 The Court bolstered its argument by citing the famous
footnote four from United States v. CaroleneProducts Co. 1 35 in which the
Court expressed a willingness to use higher scrutiny on laws that negatively impact "discrete and insular minorities" that have historically
been subjected to discrimination and are unable to protect themselves
in the political process.13 6
In Graham, the Court promised to protect foreign nationals from
discriminatory state alienage classifications. 13 7 In In re Griffiths in
1973, the Court struck down a Connecticut statute that allowed only
citizens to practice law.'3- 8 The Court rejected Connecticut's argument that citizenship was relevant to a person's suitability to be an
attorney and held that the justification was not compelling enough to
survive strict scrutiny. 139 The Court reasoned that categorically
prohibiting foreign nationals from practicing law merely because
some were unsuited to become attorneys was overinclusive and not
1 40
narrowly tailored.
132

See Maltz, supra note 34, at 1164 (arguing that the Court's holding in Graham v.

Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), went further than the Takahashi decision in requiring
"affirmative support for certain classes of aliens").
See Graham, 403 U.S. at 372. The Graham decision scrutinized Arizona and Penn133
sylvania laws that limited the extent to which LPRs could take advantage of state welfare
programs.
134
See id. at 371.
135
See id. at 372.
136
304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
137 Not everyone has such a positive reading of Graham. Professor Maltz believes that
Graham "threatened to reduce the incidents of citizenship to their barest essentials-the
right to remain in the country indefinitely, the right to return after traveling abroad, and
the right to claim the protection of the government of the United States while traveling
abroad." Maltz, supra note 34, at 1166.
138
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
139
See id. at 729. The Court stated that duties of lawyers did not involve matters of
state policy or unique responsibility such that the state could justify entrusting those duties
only to citizens. Id.
140
See id. at 725. Professor Maltz believes that, based on the reasoning of the Griffiths
decision, states would almost never be able to use alienage classifications because
"[h]istorically, few occupations have been as extensively regulated as the practice of law;
thus if states are forbidden to reserve this profession to citizens, it is difficult to see how

1394

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:1377

The Court never issued another opinion as far-reaching in its protection of foreign nationals from state alienage classifications as Graham. In a series of opinions beginning in the 1970s, the Court
narrowed the protection against discrimination afforded foreign nationals. 14 1 In Sugarman v. Dougall, the Court struck down a New York
Civil Service Law that mandated that state civil service employees be
U.S. citizens. 142 The law's objective was to ensure that the state hired
"loyal" workers. 14s The Court reasoned that the classification was
both overinclusive, because it applied to posts that did not make government policy, and underinclusive, because it did not apply to some
144
jobs that did.
Although Sugarman was positive for foreign nationals, the Court
indicated that its holding was narrow. 14 5 The decision laid the foundation for what would become the political function exception. Specifically, the Court held that states could constitutionally require
citizenship for "persons holding state elective or important nonelective executive, leg;slative, and judicial positions, for officers who participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad
public policy functions that go to the heart of representative government." 146 In dicta, the Court. clearly recognized that a state retains
the "power to exclude aliens from participation in its democratic political institutions."1 4 7 The seeds sown in the Sugarman dicta did not
bear fruit until a few years later. In the meantime, the Court continued to strike down state and local alienage classifications. 1 4
D.

The Political Function Doctrine and the Rational
Relationship Test

Foley v. Connelie"49 marked the first time the Court invoked the
political function doctrine enunciated in Sugarman to uphold a state
states could constitutionally bar aliens from any private pursuit that is open to citizens."
Maltz, supra note 34, at 1165.
141
See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S.
68 (1982); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
142
413 U.S. 634, 643, 646 (1973).
143
See id. at 641.
144
See id. at 642.
145
See id. at 647; see also 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 30, § 18.12 (describing the
Sugarman holding as "narrow").
146
Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 647.
147
See id. at 648 (dicta).
148
The Court invalidated a Puerto Rican law that curtailed the ability of foreign nationals to work as engineers, see Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores
de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976), and a New York rule that required citizenship or an intent
to naturalize to qualify for state financial aid for higher education, see Nyquist v. Mauclet,
432 U.S. 1 (1977).
149
435 U.S. 291 (1978).
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alienage classification'- 50-a New York statute that prevented foreign
nationals from obtaining jobs as state troopers. 15-. The Court held
that police officers were important public figures and, based on that
152
finding, did not apply strict scrutiny to the alienage classificaton.
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger stated that stri zt scrutiny
was appropriate where the state was distributing economic benefits on
the basis of alienage, but not where the state was defining its political
community. 1 53 In applying the less-stringent rational relationship test,
the Foley Court reasoned that the lower szandard of review was appropriate for laws relating to self-governance and the qualifications of officials whose duties involved important government functions. 5 4 The
New York law passed the rational relationship test because, among
other things, state poli'e officers were "clothed in the authority of the
155
state" and had broad discretion to enforce state laws.
The Couri expanded the scope of the political function exception the following year in Ambach v. Norwick.156 The Court upheld a
New York statute that prevented foreign nationals from obtaining permanent teaching certification if they were eligible for citizenship and
did not naturalize or if they were not yet eligible to become citizens
and would not promise to naturalize as soon as they could. 15 7 The law
essentially prevented foreign nationals who failed to meet those requirements from working in public schools.1 55 Although the Ambach
Court maintained that alienage classifications were still "inherently
suspect" and that it was no - reviving te special public interest doctrine, 159 the Court decided that t_e less-st.'ingent rational relationship
test was appropriate where a state alienage classification concerned a
function related to "the operation of the State as a governmental entity." 160 Thus, the Court stated that it would use the rational relationship standard if the state alienage classification furthered a
"governmental function." 16 1 The Court concluded that teachers furthered an important governmental function by preparing young people to become active citizens in democratic society-a role important

154

See
See
See
See
See

155

Id. at 298-99.

156

441 U.S. 68 (1979).

157

See id. at 70 & nn.1-2.
See id.
See id. at 73-75.
Id. at 78-79.
See id. at 78-81.

150

151
152
153

158
159
160
161

id. at
id.
id. at
id. at
id. at

299-300.
297.
295.
297-98.

1396

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:1377

to the country's political community' 62-and that the state law was
rationally related to that function.
In dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that alienage was not a rea16
sonable way to determine who was best-suited to serve as a teacher. 8
Justice Blackmun argued that secondary school teachers did not create or execute public policy, 164 and that being a foreign national did
not make one less able to be a secondary school teacher. 165 Noting
that the statutory scheme would prefer a less-qualified teacher who
was a U.S. citizen over a better-qualified foreign national, the dissent
argued that the majority's reasoning was "constitutionally absurd" because the New York law would not allow, for example, a French citizen
to teach French. 166 The dissent also argued that it was "logically impossible" to distinguish the New York statute at issue from other statutes the Court struck down in cases such as Sugarman.16 7 Indeed, it
seems difficult to comprehend why banning foreign nationals from
public teaching posts is acceptable, but banning noncitizens from
joining the state bar is improper.
The Court continued its expansive reading of the political function doctrine in Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, upholding a California law that
excluded foreign nationals from jobs as "peace officers."' 5 1 The case
concerned individuals who sought jobs as Spanish-speaking deputy
state probation officers.' 69 The five-Justice majority was untroubled by
the law's expansive definition of "peace officers," which covered seventy kinds ofjobs including toll service employees, cemetery sextons,
and furniture and bedding inspectors. 170 The alienage classification,
the Court concluded, was a legitimate part of "the community's process of political self-definition" 171 because deputy probation officers
"personify the State's sovereign powers."'172
The four dissenting Justices argued that California was motivated
by "state parochialism and hostility toward foreigners"-precisely the
See id.
See id. at 81 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See id. at 84 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun began his dissent by
164
agreeing with the majority that the "touchstone" of the political function doctrine was that
states could demand citizenship forjobs that formulate "broad public policy." Id. at 82-83
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). He then devoted the remainder of his dissent to criticizing the
majority's reasoning and ultimate conclusion that teachers fulfill such a role. See Ad.at
82-90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
165 See id. at 87-88 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
166
See id. at 84 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
167
See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
454 U.S. 432, 436 (1982).
168
See id. at 435.
169
170
See id. at 442-43.
Id. at 439.
171
172
Id. at 447.
162
163
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type of state action the Court promised to guard against in Graham.'73
Interestingly, the dissent noted that while this law prohibited foreign
nationals from serving as peace officers, California law permitted for174
eign nationals to become state judges.
After Cabell, some commentators believed that the Court would
soon overrule Graham and its progeny. 75 That belief, however,
proved incorrect. In 1984, over only one dissent, 76 the Court struck
177
down a Texas statute that required citizenship for notaries public.
Texas argued that notaries public played an important political function because they "authenticate written instruments, administer oaths,
and take out-of-court depositions." 78 Texas also contended that the
citizenship requirement furthered the state interest of ensuring that
notaries know state law. 179 Neither argument impressed the Court. If
Texas truly wanted to ensure that notaries public were familiar with
state law, the Court stated, then testing all potential applicants was a
better way to fulfill that goal than a citizenship classification. 8s0 Likewise, the Court mentioned that states could not require citizenship for
admission to the bar'8 ' and that notaries public played less-important
roles in the legal system than attorneys and court officials.' 8 2 Consequently, the Court concluded that notaries public did not fall within
the political function exception because that exception is reserved for
"positions intimately related to the process of democratic self-government." 18 3 After determining that the Texas law did not fall within the
exception, the Court applied strict scrutiny and struck the law
84
down. 1
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the current boundaries of
the political function doctrine are difficult to map. The Court would
likely give states wide latitude to exclude foreign nationals from public
employment, as well as from taking part in key governmental func173

See id at 463 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

174
175

See id. at 459-60 & n.10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See Maltz, supra note 34, at 1187.

176

See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 228 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In a one-

sentence dissent, Justice Rehnquist stated that he dissented for the reasons articulated in

his dissent in Sugarman v. Dougal4 413 U.S. 634, 649 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
There, Justice Rehnquist argued, among other things, that the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibited racial discrimination, but did not prohibit discrimination based on citizenship.
See Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 649 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
177
See Fainter,467 U.S. at 226-27.
178
Id. at 218 (describing the tasks fulfilled by notaries public).
179
See id. at 227-28.
180

See id.

181

See id. at 226 (citing In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 634 (1973)).
See id. at 226-27.
Id. at 220.
See id. at 228.

182
183
184
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tions, but not from a broad category of private occupations. 8 5 A state
probably could not create an expansive ban to prohibit foreign nationals from working in all kinds of public posts, but could likely exclude aliens from many specific governmental jobs, particularly ones
186
involving some degree of discretionary authority.
III
THE POLITICAL FUNCTION DOCTRINE IN PRACTICE

A.

Traditional Legal Analysis

Although the purpose of this Note is to examine the efficiency of
the political function doctrine, a brief look at how commentators traditionally analyze the doctrine is helpful. The basic framework of the
current doctrine is clear, even if predicting the outcome of any particular case analyzed under the doctrine is difficult at best. Courts subject state alienage classifications to strict scrutiny, and the political
function doctrine is an exception to strict scrutiny. 18 7 Commentators
thus criticize the political function doctrine as an "exception [that]
has swallowed the rule" 188 because the scope of the exception is easy
to widen simply by invoking "sweet-sounding rhetoric about the political community, [that enables] courts [to] transform every state employee into a policymaker."'18 9 Moreover, the Court broadly construed
the term "special public interest" and validated a wide-ranging spectrum of anti-immigrant legislation, thereby removing most meaningful protection for foreign nationals under the Yick Wo and Traux
precedents.1 90
The political function exception supposedly applies only to important jobs that involve formulating, reviewing, or executing broad
public policy. But determining whether a statute falls within this general classification is often difficult. Indeed, many cases invoking the
doctrine to uphold state alienage classifications were five-four decisions with vigorous dissents.' 91 The dissenting Justices often contended that the majority misconstrued the key terms, such as
"important" and "formulating, reviewing, or executing broad public
See 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 30, § 18.12.
See id.
187
See Maltz, supra note 34, at 1178-79 (discussing what Maltz calls the "Sugarman exception to the general rule of strict scrutiny," coined after the case that first mentioned
what eventually became the political function doctrine); John E. Richards, Public Employnent Rights of Aliens, 34 BAYLOR L. REv. 371, 372-82 (1982).
188 See Richards, supra note 187, at 380.
189 See Knapp, supra note 1, at 412.
185
186

190

See id.

See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S.
68 (1979); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
191
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policy."1 92 In many instances, the dissenting Justices probably had the
stronger argument, as the majority seemed to expand the meaning of
the phrase "formulating public policy" to "carrying out public policy." 19 Such a broad interpretation, Justice Marshall suggested,
would enable states to prohibit foreign nationals from working as
firefighters because firefighters technically carry out the public policy
of putting out fires. 194 The dissenting Justices in Ambach and Cabell
also argued that the majority was irrational in expanding the concept
of policy maker to include teachers and voluntary fire wardens.195
Two competing values are at play in political function doctrine
jurisprudence. The Court attempts to balance the symbolic value of
citizenship against the fundamental value of equal treatment under
the law. The conservative members of the Court generally extol the
virtues of citizenship and praise "a person's relationship to this country as a citizen." 196 Conservative Justices also focus on the mutability
of citizenship and emphasize that legal permanent residents (LPRs)
can choose to naturalize. 19 7 Consequently, these Justices believe that
prohibiting states from using alienage classifications would erode the
98
value of citizenship.'
On the other hand, the more liberal Justices favor a construction
of the word "important" that would apply only to a person holding "a
high-level job in public administration that affects large groups of the
body politic."1 99 This seems more logical and more consistent with
the notion of preserving important government functions for citizens.
As one commentator argued, the result of whether a particular type of
employment falls within the political function exception is often decided by which side is able to convince five Justices rather than in
192

See, e.g., Foley, 435 U.S. at 303-04 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

193 See id at 305 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Knapp, supranote 1, at 412-13 (discussing the issue of determining whether a low-level official actually formulates government policy).
See Foley, 435 U.S. at 303-04 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Knapp, supra note 1, at
194
412-13 (discussing how the political function doctrine, if applied expansively, would consider firefighters and public street cleaners to be policy makers).
195
See Cabell, 454 U.S at 451-55 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Ambach, 441 U.S. at 84
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See Richards, supra note 187, at 378-79.
196
See Knapp, supra note 1, at 423, 425-27. Knapp provides an excellent critique of
197
conservative arguments in support of alienage classifications. She notes that citizenship is
a poor proxy for loyalty and that conservative opinions reflect an utter lack of knowledge
about what gaining citizenship entails.
198 See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 651 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment should not be invoked to strike down a state
alienage classification because "the Constitution itself recognizes a basic difference between citizens and aliens").
199 See Richards, supra note 187, at 380.
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accordance with any coherent logical framework.2 00 Moreover, the
Court's more liberal Justices contend that discrimination based on citizenship runs counter to the fundamental value of equal treatment
under the law20 1 and the belief that one should judge individuals
based on qualifications.20 2 Alienage classifications that govern employment ensure that the best citizen gets the job, not the best
203
candidate.
B.

The Political Function Doctrine and the Employment Market

An efficient legal doctrine provides the most positive results with
the fewest negative side effects. 20 4 This section evaluates whether the
political function doctrine is efficient. First, this section assesses
whether the political function doctrine coincides with the proper role
of regulation in markets. Second, this section outlines the effect of
the political function doctrine on the market.
Federal and state governments regulate markets for many goods
and services, such as radio communications, utilities, and employment. Markets are generally more efficient with less regulation; government intervention is warranted only where a market cannot
operate efficiently on its own because of a market failure caused by
20 5
monopoly, high information costs, or other externalities.
States did not enact citizenship requirements to correct a market
failure and help the market operate more efficiently. Citizenship is
not connected to competence or job performance and is therefore
200
See Maltz, supra note 34, at 1180-81 (counting the votes in modern alienage jurisprudence decisions and noting that the justices who held the "swing votes" failed to "articulate[ I a clear, generally-applicable theory for distinguishing permissible from
nonpermissible distinctions between citizens and aliens").
201
See, e.g., Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 307 (1978) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the "exclusion of aliens" from state trooper jobs "violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
202
See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 85-86 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(contending that it is illogical to judge applicants for teaching posts based on their citizenship status as opposed to their individual qualifications).
203
See id. at 84 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that an alienage classification would
prevent a well-qualified noncitizen Englishwoman from teaching "the grammar of the English language").
204
See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY,AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 n.4 (1983);
THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 9 (Paul Burrows & Cento G. Veljanovski eds., 1981)

(stating that "social efficiency is a technical concept of unimprovability" in which everyone

benefits).
205
See FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 11-14 (Avery Wiener Katz
ed., 1998); Richard A. Posner, Essay, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L.
Rav. 513, 515 (1987) (stating that the government should not intervene in a market "not

marked by externalities, monopoly... [or] high costs of information, or any other condition that might justify such intervention on economic grounds").
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not a rational job requirement.20 6 State alienage classifications require employers to discriminate on the basis of citizenship when selecting candidates for so-called political jobs, thus reducing the
number of eligible candidates for the targeted jobs.2 07 In such circumstances, employers must choose the best citizen for the job, as opposed to the best candidate.20 In an unrestrained market economy,
the merit principle-the principle that the best worker at any given
wage rate is hired-is self-enforcing. As one commentator noted,
"[e] mployers have an obvious financial self-interest in making employment decisions on the basis of merit. And competition, if not greed,
20 9
Berequires or leads them to pursue that self-interest with vigor."
employhiring
from
employers
prevent
cause alienage classifications
ees based only on merit, these classifications harm employers by
disqualifying job candidates based on a characteristic wholly irrelevant
to work performance.
Some state alienage classifications prohibit foreign nationals
from owning particular kinds of businesses or engaging in certain occupations. 2 10 These citizenship requirements limit entry in those
targeted business fields and thereby stifle competition, based on a criterion that is not connected to competence in the given field. Ideally,
consumers would select businesses based on price and competence,
but citizenship requirements add an additional, irrational factor that
impacts market performance.
The primary proponents of state citizenship requirements are
practitioners in specific fields and other interest groups who seek to
stifle-not encourage-competition. 2 1' Thus, citizenship requirements are a form of protectionism,2 1 2 the effect of which is to increase
In fact, a citizenship requirement is in many ways the opposite of a ban on racial206
ethnic discrimination. A discrimination prohibition forbids an employer from considering
particular characteristics, such as race and ethnicity, when making hiring decisions; a citizenship requirement forces an employer to consider citizenship when hiring employees.
See Plascencia et al., supra note 5, at 18-19 (listing current state citizenship require207
ments for jobs such as boiler engineers, private detectives and firefighters). See generally
JohnJ. Donohue III, Essay, Is Title VIIEfficient , 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411 (1986) (discussing
the effect of racism on the labor market and on minority workers seeking jobs); David A.
Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discriminationin Employment: The Case for Numerical
Standards,79 GEo. L.J. 1619 (1991) (same).
See Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CH. L. REv. 235, 241
208
(1971). Fiss states that "[t]his will tend to maximize the businessman's own wealth, and it
will foster society's interest in efficiency-producing the greatest number of goods and
services at the lowest cost." Id.
209

Id. at 249-50.

See Plascencia et al., supra note 5, at 18-19. Specifically, some current state citizenship requirements prohibit noncitizens from obtaining liquor licenses, becoming bail
bondsmen, or forming certain types of organizations.
211
See id. at 8.
212
See id.
210
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prices for products and services in the protected industry.2 13 In
regard, the political function doctrine seems to run counter to
normal goal of regulation: it allows states to pass laws that make
market less efficient.
The overlap between alienage and national origin is significant, a
fact that historically enabled states to use alienage classifications to
target specific racial and ethnic groups. 2 14 Laws are expressive and do
more than identify prohibited or permissible conduct-laws send
messages to the populace. 2 15 By prohibiting foreign nationals from
serving as deputy probation officers or teachers, the state signals to its
residents that foreign nationals are considered to be less suitable, less
trustworthy, and less competent. 21 6 Thus, some commentators believe
that such laws tacitly encourage discrimination and negative feelings
toward foreign nationals. 217 Moreover, discriminatory alienage classifications perpetuate stereotypes about foreign nationals 218 and impose the substantial psychological costs associated with labeling a
219
group of people inferior.
Citizenship requirements create a de facto loophole through
which states can not only allow but even require employers to engage
in racial discrimination. Alienage classifications-often motivated by
racial prejudice-deserve careful scrutiny because this country's history is replete with examples of racial hostility directed at foreignthe
this
the
the

218
See, e.g., Donohue, supra note 207, at 1412-19 (describing the neoclassical econonic model of the labor market and the effect of discrimination on that market). Donohue analyzes racial, as opposed to alienage, discrimination, but the effects on the market
would be analogous to a protectionist ban against employing a particular class of people.
214
See, e.g., Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (invalidating a
state law that prohibited noncitizens from obtaining a fishing license with the intention of
targeting Japanese individuals).
215
See Deborah Heilman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection,85 MINN. L. REv.
1, 1-3 (2000) (arguing that in Brown v. Board of Education the Court understood that the
"expressive nature" of segregation perpetuated the image of African Americans as being of
"lower worth" and that the constitutional harm resulted from the law's expressive
cha-acter).
216
See Romero, supra note 25, at 883-85. Romero discusses, inter alia, the constitutional requirement that the U.S. president be a "natural born citizen" and the effect this
has on views of what kinds of people are, therefore, the most loyal. Romero argued that
the "Presidential Eligibility Clause" is a proxy for loyalty because it "suggests that natural
born citizens were more presumptively loyal than naturalized ones." Id. at 884. Romero
also contends that racial and ethnic profiling sends messages to the populace about who is
most likely to be disloyal to the country. Id. at 878 (noting studies that found that "the
legal measures taken by the federal government reinforce deeply-held negative stereotypes-foreignness and possibly disloyalty-about Arabs and Muslims" (citations
omitted)).
217
See id.
218
See id.
219
See id. at 878.
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ers. 22 0 Allowing states and local governments to discriminate based
22 1
on citizenship encourages the use of covert racial classifications classifications motivated by racial animus that courts should not tolerate. The United States has, regrettably, embarrassed itself on several
occasions in history because of its treatment of foreign nationals and
use of racist alienage classifications.2 2 2 Courts should not support a
legal doctrine that allows states to pass laws that will later stain the
country's history.
By enacting citizenship requirements for jobs, states can covertly
engage in inefficient racial discrimination. 22 3 Race, like citizenship, is
not relevant to a person's job performance and is therefore an irrational factor to consider in employment decisions.22 4 Racial discrimination is also inefficient because it causes the disfavored class to invest
less in human capital.22 5 Members of a targeted group are less likely
to invest in education and training if the employment market will not
reward that investment with greater opportunities. 22 6 The use of race
as a criterion for hiring eliminates-for a large class of people-the
incentive for self-improvement because race is beyond a person's control. 2 2 7 In such circumstances, it would be rational for minorities to
220
See Knapp, supranote 1, at 413. Statistical evidence strongly suggests a correlation
between race and alienage. See id. at 401-02.
221
See Boyd, supra note 4, at 338-39.
222
See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); Examining Bd,of Eng'rs, Architects
& Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973);
Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); see

also MIGRATION

POLICY INSTIT., AMERICA'S CHALLENGE: DOMESTIC SECURITY,CIVIL LIBERTIES,

at 1 (2003) (detailing national origin profiling
on the part of the federal government in its search for alleged terrorists and the plight of
Arab and Muslim foreign nationals embroiled in the crackdown).
223
See Fiss, supra note 208, at 237 (stating that use of race as a factor in hiring "would
in any event impair rather than advance productivity and wealth maximization for the
individual businessman and for society as a whole"). There is a debate among scholars
regarding the efficiency of racial discrimination and prohibitions against racial discrimination, but the complexities of that debate are beyond the scope of this Note. See, e.g., GARY
BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION I (2d ed. 1971); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 27.1 (3d ed. 1986); Donohue, supra note 207, at 1411; Posner,
supra note 205, at 517; Strauss, supra note 207, at 1643; Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste
Principle,92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2422 (1994).
224
See e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 87 (1979) (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (stating that a citizenship requirement for public school teachers was "irrational"); Strauss,
supra note 207, at 1642.
225
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 223, at 2418-19. Sunstein provides a thorough analysis of the efficiency of racial discrimination and legal bans on discrimination. See also
Strauss, supra note 207, at 1619 (engaging in economic analysis of racial discrimination
and covering some of the same concepts as Sunstein).
226
See Sunstein, supra note 223, at 2419 (describing the "vicious cycle or even a spiral"
that could be caused by racial discrimination as minority group members failed to reach
their full potential by not investing in training and education).
227
See Fiss, supra note 208, at 241; Strauss, supra note 207, at 1643; Sunstein, supra note
223, at 2416. For a discussion of the "motivational" effect of discrimination on minorities,
see Fiss, supra note 208, at 239.
AND NATIONAL UNITY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11,
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invest less in education.2 28 Underinvestment in training and education by a class of workers prevents those workers from reaching their
maximum potential and prevents society from benefiting from those
workers' skills. 2 29 Thus, the political function doctrine is inefficient
because it protects state alienage classifications from judicial scrutiny.
The political function doctrine affects a significant number of potential employees. About one million foreign nationals gain permanent resident status every year, 230 and they are typically eligible (but
not required) to naturalize after five years. 231 Thus, there are about
five million LPRs in the United States who cannot yet naturalize at any
given time. An LPR would not rationally invest in training for a profession from which he or she is barred. The five-year delay could
cause LPRs to forego certain investments in education and training
altogether, or, in the best circumstances, only create an inefficient
transition period in which an LPR cannot maximize his or her
productivity.

232

In addition to affecting a significant number of potential employees, the political function doctrine, as currently interpreted by the
Court, applies to a wide range ofjobs as diverse as public school teachers and peace officers. 233 New York has citizenship requirements for
23 4
In
establishing churches and serving as a public library director.
2 35
In Texas
Illinois, only citizens can serve as labor dispute mediators.
2 36
Texas reand Illinois, noncitizens cannot receive liquor licenses.
quires citizenship of bail bondsmen and public safety department employees. 237 New Jersey requires citizenship of firefighters, boiler
engineers, tax collectors, pharmacists, physicians, optometrists, and
See Sunstein, supra note 223, at 2417.
See id. at 2419; Strauss, supra note 207, at 1626-27 (stating that discrimination
would cause "inefficient levels of investment in human capital" and mean that "society will
228
229

not benefit fully from [the minority group's] talents"); see also Donohue, supranote 207, at
1412 (stating that "legislation that prohibits employer discrimination may actually en-

hance ... economic efficiency"). Donohue believes laws that prohibit discrimination will
run "discriminators... from the market more rapidly" and therefore increase overall market efficiency sooner. Id. at 1426.
230

RUTH ELLEN WASSEM, DOMESTIC SOCIAL POLICY DIVISION, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY

Order Code RL32235, at 2 (Feb. 18, 2004), at http://
fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/31352.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).
See FRAGOMEN, JR. ET AL., supra note 88, § 5:14.
231
232 Some state citizenship requirements include exceptions for LPRs who promise to
naturalize at the earliest opportunity, but many laws do not include such exceptions. See
Plascencia et al., supra note 5, at 19.
233
See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S.
ON PERMANENT ADMISSIONS,

68 (1979). Almost every town has teachers and police officers. Citizenship requirements
for these jobs are thus likely to have a significant effect on the market.
234
235
236
237

See
See
See
See

Plascencia et al., supra note 5, at 19.
id.
id.
id.
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private detectives. 238 Thus, the political function doctrine significantly affects market function because it permits state alienage classifications for many occupations.
Fortunately, state citizenship requirements are much less common than in prior decades,2 39 and states no longer enforce all citizenship requirements. 2 40 Despite this, the citizenship requirements that
states do not enforce are often still listed on agency web pages. 241 As
mentioned earlier, the expressive significance of laws is great-even if
the law is not enforced and does not limit access to a particular occupation. Likewise, the lack of routine uniform enforcement could lead
to selective enforcement against particular ethnic groups. 242 Moreover, disseminating information about state alienage restrictions in
public documents or on agency websites could discourage noncitizens
from applying for jobs because they might not know that the citizenship requirements are not actually enforced in practice.
W
SUGGESTED REFINEMENTS TO THE CURRENT DOCTRINE

Although a major shift in the Court's alienage jurisprudence is
unlikely and some form of the political function doctrine will probably continue to exist, some refinements could better limit the scope of
the doctrine and thereby reduce the inefficiencies introduced into
the market. These proposed refinements would protect against racial
discrimination and ensure that state laws covered by the political function doctrine truly go to the heart of democratic self-governance.
This Note employs the traditional language and tests of the Court's
equal protection jurisprudence, as opposed to economic terms, to
demonstrate that this more efficient proposal is consistent with standard equal protection concepts. In short, the proposal's justification
emanates from the economic analysis of the political function doctrine, but the new framework this Note advocates remains consistent
with standard equal protection jurisprudence.
Courts should adopt a new approach when analyzing state laws
that purportedly fall within the political function doctrine. Specifically, courts should add another step to the analysis to prevent covert
racial classifications, read the political function doctrine more narrowly, and increase the level of scrutiny to intermediate scrutiny for
See id.
See id. at 9 (finding that states impose far fewer citizenship requirements than they
did twenty years ago).
240
See id. at 16. The authors report that state officials informed them that citizenship
requirements "were about twice as likely to be ignored as enforced." Id.
238
239

241

Id. at 17.

242

See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).
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classifications that fall within the political function exception to traditional strict scrutiny analysis.
A.

Recognize Racial Animus and Covert Classifications

First, courts should carefully scrutinize state laws to ensure that
alienage classifications are not actually state attempts to classify covertly based on race. Supreme Court alienage jurisprudence has, regrettably, failed to adequately consider the potential misuse of
alienage classifications to target particular racial groups.2 43 Racial
prejudice was associated with discrimination against immigrants many
times during our country's history, 244 and laws that classify based on
race are properly subject to strict scrutiny. Courts should first look for
evidence of racial animus when examining a local alienage classification and then explicitly indicate whether such animus exists. Requiring courts to explicitly indicate their findings regarding racial animus
will ensure that courts do not perform this in a cursory manner and
provide a record for appeal if the lower court is erroneous. Considering the overlap between race and alienage more seriously would help
eliminate covert racial classifications.
The Supreme Court already employs methods for detecting the
presence of racial animus.2 45 In applying the first step of this proposed refinement to the political function doctrine, courts could use
the principles the Supreme Court established in equal protection jurisprudence regarding racial classifications to determine if a state
alienage classification is actually a covert racial classification. In determining whether a government actor violated the Equal Protection
Clause, courts search for signs of discriminatory intent and evidence
of disparate impact on the racial group.2 46 To support a finding of
243
See Boyd, supra note 4, at 323 (stating that "[a]s racial classifications fall into disfavor with the judiciary, those with improper motives may instead turn to alienage classifications"); see alsoJohnson, supra note 2, at 1499-1509 (discussing the racial demographics of
immigrants and the failure of courts to adequately consider racism when scrutinizing alienage classifications). Boyd notes the extensive history of alienage discrimination in the
United States and contends that it was "motivated by racism, xenophobia, irrational stereotypes, [or] a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group." Boyd, supra note 4, at 323
(footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).
244
See Knapp, supra note 1, at 413-15.
See 3 ROTUNDA & NowAv, supra note 30, § 18.4 (detailing "basic principles regard245
ing how a court determines the existence of a classification" such as searching for a government actor's "discriminatory purpose" and noting the "disparate impact" of a law); Charles
Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, andEqual Protection:Reckoning with UnconsciousRacism, 39 STAN. L.
REv. 317, 325 (1987). Lawrence is more critical of the discriminatory intent requirement.
Although discriminatory intent is sometimes hard to prove, the principles announced in
the Court's decisions are helpful.
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (announcing that both disparate
246
impact and discriminatory intent are required components of a prima facie case of racial
discrimination). Evidence of disparate impact includes items such as statistics indicating
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discriminatory intent, the intent to discriminate need not be the sole
motivating factor behind the state's decision to use a classification as
long as the intent to discriminate was one factor.2 47 Proof of disparate
impact, along with other circumstantial evidence regarding the government's intent, satisfies the burden of establishing a prima facie
248
case of racial animus.
Yick Wo indicates that the Court will also infer discriminatory intent from discriminatory application of a rule. In Yick Wo, the city
ordinance at issue was facially neutral-it required a permit to operate a laundry in a wooden building-but the city only enforced the
rule against Chinese individuals. 249 There, the disparate impact was
so extreme that "no reason for it exist[ed] except hostility to the race
and nationality to which the petitioners belong[ed] ."25
In some situations, the Court may also presume discriminatory
intent if a government actor discriminated either in the past or in
another area. 251 Thus, the Court might transfer evil intent from one
time period or one area to either the present day or another
252
location.
As the above discussion demonstrates, techniques and principles
for detecting racial animus are well-established and lower courts are
familiar with their application. Therefore, courts could apply the first
step of this proposed refinement to the political function doctrinesearching for racial bias in the state's use of an alienage classification-without the need to develop a new analytical framework.
B.

Construe "Political Function" Narrowly

Courts should also construe the political function doctrine more
narrowly. Permitting states to read "political function" broadly enables states to discriminate against racial groups and allocate economic benefits based on citizenship. The more broadly courts
construe the doctrine, the more inefficiencies the doctrine is likely to
cause in the market. In particular, the Court should interpret the
terms "important" and "formulating policy" narrowly. 253 Additionally,
the imbalance in the racial groups affected by the scrutinized law. See 3 ROTUNDA & NowAK,supra note 30, § 18.4.
247
See Vill.of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66
(1977).
Washington, 426 U.S. at 242 (stating that "an invidious discriminatory purpose may
248
often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts").
249
See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368 (1886).
250
Id. at 374.
251
See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 207 (1973). So far, the Court has only
used this presumption in school desegregation cases.
252
See id. at 210-11.
253
Indeed, the Court has emphasized the importance of limiting the political function
exception. See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 222 & n.7 (1984) (stating that "the political-
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courts should not use rhetoric to expand excessively the notion of
"policy makers" to include low-level government jobs and thereby
avoid subjecting alienage classifications to strict judicial scrutiny
under the guise of a purported "political function."
Narrowing the construction of "political function" is necessary because increasing the level of scrutiny for political functions from rational relationship to intermediate scrutiny alone might not
adequately police judicial misuse of the exception. If the term "political function" becomes all-encompassing, courts would still subject
alienage classifications to a lower level of scrutiny (intermediate) than
is proper (strict). Because courts routinely use rules of statutory construction to interpret exceptions narrowly, this proposal should not be
2 54
new to judges.
C.

Subject Political Functions to Intermediate Scrutiny

Finally, even if a state alienage classification truly relates to a political function, courts should apply intermediate scrutiny rather than
the rational basis test to the classification.2 5 5 Intermediate scrutiny is
necessary because the rational basis test fails to adequately police state
laws that classify based on alienage. While prohibiting all alienage classifications would arguably be more efficient, intermediate scrutiny is a
reasonable compromise and could limit the scope of the political
function doctrine and its corresponding negative impact on the market without eliminating the doctrine altogether. Intermediate scrutiny would help prevent the exception from swallowing the rule by
invalidating state laws that are not adequately tailored to achieve important government objectives.
The Court currently subjects gender classifications to intermediate scrutiny,2 56 so this proposal also does not require the development
of a new analytical framework. In the gender context, the state must
establish an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the classification
to pass intermediate scrutiny. 257 Typically, that means the state must
seek to fulfill an important government objective and the means must
be substantially related to achieving that objective.2 58 Intermediate
scrutiny involves a more searching examination of whether the state
function exception must be narrowly construed; otherwise the exception
rule and depreciate the significance that should attach to the designation
'discrete and insular' minority for whom heightened judicial solicitude is
254
See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 45 (7th ed. 1981)

will swallow the
of a group as a
appropriate").

(discussing various canons of statutory interpretation).
255
See Boyd, supra note 4, at 345-49.
256
See 3 ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 30, § 18.20 (describing the Court's framework
for analyzing gender classifications).
257
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531-36 (1996).
258
See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
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could achieve the same ends through nondiscriminatory means than
2 59
rational basis review.
CONCLUSION

Regrettably, the United States does not always live up to the fundamental principles of equality embodied in the Constitution. If the
United States is a "welcoming country" as President Bush contends,
then it is a country that paradoxically welcomes foreign nationals and
then resents them for having arrived. State laws that severely constrain the employment opportunities of newcomers illustrate this
resentment.
Laws that discriminate against foreign nationals are economically
inefficient as well as morally improper and constitutionally questionable. Unfortunately, history shows that state and local governments direct racial animosity toward foreign nationals without considering
market efficiencies. In addition to the moral and constitutional arguments against racist treatment of foreign nationals, economic analysis
provides an independent justification for limiting the political function doctrine because it perpetuates market inefficiencies.
Consequently, states should not enact broad alienage classifications in the employment context, and federal courts should carefully
scrutinize such classifications and limit them to posts involving a
state's self-governance. Greater limitations on state use of alienage
classifications would protect politically powerless foreign nationals
from discrimination and allow labor markets to function efficiently.
This Note proposes doctrinal changes that are consistent with traditional equal protection jurisprudence and demonstrates that the political function doctrine remains a Byzantine, constitutional oddity that
is not worth its cost.

"259 See id.
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